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Abstract: 
The recent decision of the US President to adopt a protectionist policy vs. Chinese goods could trigger a 
domino effect in the global context. The conquest by the Chinese economy of new markets such as the 
African countries is part of a strategy which includes a network of alliances in order to mitigate the 
effects of the policy of protectionism. Similar responses also seem to have been considered by the USA. 
In the current, highly connected context, in which the value chain is globalized i.e. highly segmented in 
many countries, there is little space for isolationist or protectionist policies. Thus the capability to 
form networks of alliances between nations, even temporary in nature or limited to specific areas, 
seems the key strategy to mitigate negative effects and win the global challenge.  
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Introduction:  
What will happen to the global economy in 2019?  
After that, the full effects of the commercial policy based on protectionism vs. Chinese imports 
launched by the US administration will be visible. The recent choice of the Trump administration, 
consisting of tariffs on specific goods imported from China, opens new debates. Recent research 
conducted by Varas and Maydanchik estimates a cost from the tariffs of close to $200 billion USD to 
the USA, while other reports and investigations provide different numbers but similar effects (Varas and 
Maydanchik 2018; Rynne, 2018).  
But, what will its impact be on the economy and how is it destined to change the global scenario?  
The domino effect is not so easy to forecast, because a high number of variables and conditions 
(intensity, sectors, ratio) have been put into play which must be modeled, and at the moment the picture 
has not assumed a definitive form (Rynne, 2018). On the other hand, many politicians and decision 
  
 
 
2 
makers are looking with caution to the US decisions as a milestone on the path of globalization; some see 
the beginning of the end of globalization, others simply consider it a corrective policy against the unfair 
interpretation of the rules, which characterized the Chinese manufacturing sector and its vigorous growth 
in the last decade. 
Recently, President Trump tweeted on 18th September 2018: 
“China has been taking advantage of the United States on Trade for many years. They also know 
that I am the one that knows how to stop it. There will be great and fast economic retaliation against 
China if our farmers, ranchers and/or industrial workers are targeted!” 
So, what are the potential changes in the flow of goods? 
The first hypothesis sees the European markets inundated by Chinese merchandising in the short term, but 
does not consider that other EU countries could follow and emulate the US example in their own 
commercial policies, so it does not include the effects of a similar reaction (Rynne, 2018). 
Now, many institutions, such as banks, universities and think tanks, are searching for the answer 
to these and other questions. The Economist recently dedicated provocative editorials to this theme, such 
as ‘America’s tariffs on China are likely to last for some time’ (The Economist, 2018). However, for an 
adequate evaluation, more time is needed in order to know what the moves of the United States’ 
counterparts will be. 
 
 
Methods & Materials:  
This article has been based on data available from different official reports, journals and academic books. 
The collection of available literature, analyses and observations based on news reports signals the starting 
point. The author’s interactions and meetings with professional associations, and the discussions at 
conferences and seminars with NGO managers, economists, individuals responsible for international 
policy and diplomats, who are actively working on these topics, provided successful foundations for the 
work.  
Finally, it appears useful to highlight that the nature of the present work is policy-based and the 
analysis has been realized with descriptive and inductive methods. 
 
 
 
Results and Discussion:  
It is useful to remember that a great part of our efforts, as economists, is intended to provide 
others with an idea of the future, in other terms, to do forecasts.  
However, while the global arena is occupied or “distracted” by the dualism, liberalism vs. 
protectionism, another significant topic is destined to go undetected. If we enlarge the scope of our 
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considerations to the global scenario, we can see that China, which is becoming a significant player on the 
African scene, is increasing its presence in terms of FDI on the continent. Africa, as is well known, 
represents a new sales market, heterogeneous but able to absorb the excess production of the big 
economies and at the same time to attract considerable foreign investments in big sectors such as mobility 
(infrastructure and railways), oil extraction, energy development, water, metal production and digital 
infrastructures.  
The presence of Chinese investors in Africa, although widely debated (China is the most important lender 
for many African countries), does not seem particularly high in terms of volume. In 2017, the inflow of 
FDI in Africa was $41.7 billion USD, 2.9% of the total FDI in the world (UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2018).  
 
Table 1. The distribution of the African FDI flow. 
 
 
FDI 
Flows 
 
2005-2007 2014 2015 2016 2017 2005-2007 2015 2016 2017 
 
Millions of USD As a percentage of gross fixed capital formation 
Africa 
Inward 38,390 52,440 56,633 53,190 41,172 14.4 11.9 12.4 9.7 
Outward 6,994 13,598 10,844 11,234 12,078 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.8 
North Africa 
Inward 18,768 12,039 12,256 13,831 13,271 17.8 7.8 9.1 9.1 
Outward 2,275 770 1,364 1,514 1,323 2.2 0.9 1.0 0.9 
West Africa 
Inward 7,909 12,148 10,179 12,694 11,307 14.4 9.0 14.6 12.8 
Outward 784 2,193 2,224 2,188 1,888 0.7 2.1 2.4 2.1 
Central Africa 
Inward 2,898 5,306 8,305 7,345 5,733 19.3 21.7 25.4 20.9 
Outward 67 185 345 305 193 0.4 0.9 1.1 0.7 
East Africa 
Inward 2,864 6,578 6,865 7,883 7,625 12.9 10.4 11.3 10.5 
Outward 81 157 110 82 174 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 
South Africa 
Inward 5,950 16,370 19,028 11,437 3,836 8.5 18.8 12.9 4.0 
Outward 3,787 10,294 6,801 7,146 8,500 5.5 6.7 8.0 9.0 
World 
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Inward 1,415,431 1,338,532 1,921,306 1,867,533 1,429,807 11.4 10.4 10.1 7.4 
Outward 1,451,593 1,262,007 1,621,890 1,473,283 1,429,972 11.7 8.8 8.0 7.4 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018. 
 
From Table 1, it appears evident that the trend of FDI flows in Africa accelerated in terms of inflow in the 
period 2014-2016. In geographic terms, the largest amount in absolute values was destined mainly to the 
North and South regions, which present logistical advantages with numerous ports such as Tanger-Med 
located on the Strait of Gibraltar which became, in a decade, the biggest port in Africa in terms of volume 
traded. In 2017, this port exceeded 50 million tons for the first time, and the logistics platform is ready to 
increase the future acceleration of African trade (Tanger Med Special Agency, 2018).  
The following table synthesizes the amount of FDI stock realized by foreign countries in Africa 
in the period 2011-2016.  
Table 2. Top 10 investing countries by FDI stock in Africa in the period 2011-2016 (in billions of USD).  
 
Country 2011 2016 Differential (2011-2016)  
Increase in 
% 
USA 57 57 0 0.0 
UK 54 55 1 1.9 
France 52 49 -3 -5.8 
China 16 40 34 213.0 
South Africa 23 24 1 4.3 
Italy 13 23 10 77.0 
Singapore 16 17 1 6.3 
India 16 14 -2 -13.0 
Hong Kong, China 7 13 6 86.0 
Switzerland 11 13 2 18.2 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018.  
 
It appears evident from the data that the presence of Chinese investors in Africa is not so high compared 
to others; in terms of FDI stock, China was positioned in fourth place in 2016. However, looking at the 
potential increasing trend in the period 2011-2016, we can observe that the only country which increased 
its stock by almost 213% is China. The other three countries positioned at the top remained substantially 
at the same level, with the exclusion of France.  
Of course, this data needs to be contextualized, so it seems useful to remember that, in the period 
2011-2016, the EU countries were affected to different extents by the consequences of the financial crisis 
born in the US (2007-2009), which reduced aggregate demand and contracted the resources available to 
be set aside for the FDI.  
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In the same period, the Chinese economy was increasing without signs of crisis; to cite one 
example, the average annual GDP growth was up 7%, so the surplus of manufactured goods was destined 
for new markets, and the FDI was directed to Africa which was, although in a different way, experiencing 
a positive phase characterized by increases in demand and consumption, and, in turn, requests for new 
infrastructures and technologies to drive the development process (Bastos de Morais, 2016).  
Thus, putting together the information deducted from Tables 1 and 2 above, it appears evident 
that the increase of the FDI during the period considered was to a large extent supported by China, and 
that the economic presence of the Chinese economy in Africa is destined to surpass those of the top three 
investors in the coming years.  
This is the key point of the Chinese strategies: to increase their presence in the new markets. 
Given this framework, we should remember that the next three decades will be characterized by strong 
economic growth in Africa, as affirmed by different economists (Bastos de Morais, 2016).  
Coming back to the geo-economics scenario, it is opportune to consider that in a global context 
with a high level of connections, the move of one player does not remain without a countermove from 
other players. 
So, with respect to this issue, what is happening on the other side of the ocean with the other 
major world power, the USA?  
Apart from the costs, as mentioned above, the USA with its protectionist measures is returning to 
the old international policy adopted during the 1970s, i.e. increasing its economic and political influence 
in Latin America, as can be demonstrated by two timely facts. Recently, the USA signed an agreement in 
favor of free trade between the USA, Mexico and Canada, surpassing the old NAFTA agreement signed 
in 1994. Brazil and the USA are signing an agreement to permit the US Department of Defense to use the 
satellite base in the Amazon region built to launch artificial satellites into space. With respect to the past, 
these specific issues can be inserted in an international policy which attempts to transform the US from an 
oppressive neighbor or rival into a business and technological partner for Latin American countries.  
This picture configures a new theory about “blocs”. From one side, China is adopting a closer 
relationship with many African countries and Russia, and on the other side, the USA is enlarging its 
sphere of influence in Latin America to extend its sales market. This scenario is generating a sort of “new 
dynamic equilibrium” in which the most influential economies of the world have their “new allies”. It is 
similar to the strategies of the Cold War being transferred to the commercial and economic arenas (Grinin 
and Korotayev, 2015). 
However, with respect to the 1970s, we now have a more theoretical basis, as “game theory” has 
been enriched by new developments and principles (Gintis, 2009; Schecter and Gintis, 2016).  
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Who will be the winner of the “new business war”? The answer is the superpower (USA or 
China) which is enable to engage the most emergent countries in number and weight on its side. We can 
consider the following to be part of the Chinese galaxy: Russia, part of Africa (in particular Angola and 
Mozambique), and Iran. This only considers the middle powers; of course, the full list is longer. Within 
the USA’s sphere of influence we can consider, without the pretension of being exhaustive, Saudi Arabia 
and Israel in the Middle East, South Korea in Asia and some Latin American countries, as cited above. Of 
course, the key strategy is the capability of attracting countries in every bloc. 
And Europe?  
Europe, although it is considered a unique bloc with a single currency, has 27 different views on 
foreign, commercial, and immigration policies. In theory it is close to the USA due to the NATO pact, but 
in practice it is equidistant from the two blocs. It does not have the same perspective for the future within 
itself; internal divisions together with demographic dynamics are crucial factors which reduce its potential 
and the advantages of the larger scale blocs (Parsi and Ikenberry, 2014). 
Sun Tzu’s lessons, magisterially expressed in The Art of War, are well known to the Chinese 
establishment, while I have many doubts about the current American establishment’s knowledge of his 
writings (Sun Tzu, 2016).  
I am not able to affirm whether this scenario, which has turned into a game of chess, is 
completely desired or not; it could be hiding the real intentions of the two actors, in which case the overall 
effect is one of monitoring and measuring rather than the surface issue, which is the impact of tariffs on 
bilateral trade.  
The rise of new emergent countries such as India, which is growing at a significant level, could 
counterbalance the weight of China in the future and open up more complex paradigms.  
It is evident that the sustainability of the protectionist measures is related to the dimensions of the 
blocs formed by nations. The bloc adopts a free trade policy internally and a protectionist policy 
externally to mitigate the negative effects. So, once again, the dimension, the nature, and the 
characteristics of the countries embedded in the bloc become the key factors to winning the global 
challenge, because (in the same way as the players of a football team) if the mosaic of nations is to be 
efficient, it must be composed with the right complementarity; in my view, this “new race” to complete 
the mosaic sees China clearly at an advantage.  
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
In the global world the current situation is fluid and in a state of continuous transformation; this is 
not a commonplace scenario. It is recommended that the decision makers, and all those responsible for 
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international relationships (including politicians, NGO managers, diplomats, top managers and 
businessmen), adopt a long-term vision which is able to go beyond the old schemes and ideological 
visions.  
Recently, in surprising way, President Trump publically declared his respect and admiration for a 
historic enemy in the form of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. Therefore, it is not impossible 
that in the future we could see a pact between President Trump and the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. 
Ultimately, unusual combinations are potentially more possible now than in the past, because it is clear to 
a large part of the establishment that none has the potential to win the global challenges alone.  
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